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Preface
I n January 2007, leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) affirmed their commitment to the creation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 and “to trans-form ASEAN into a region with free movement of goods, services, investment, skilled labor, and 
freer flow of capital.” To move the work program forward toward AEC 2015, the ASEAN central bank 
governors agreed to conduct a study to assess if ASEAN financial integration is on track and to recom-
mend any further initiatives needed to achieve financial integration by 2015. In the same manner, the 
ASEAN finance ministers endorsed a study that comprehensively maps the current financial conditions 
in ASEAN and that makes relevant recommendations on the next steps needed to achieve integrated 
financial markets in ASEAN by 2015. 
Recognizing the similarities of the scope as well as the possible overlaps and duplication of outputs, the 
two studies were combined into a Combined Study on Assessing the Financial Landscape and Formulating 
Milestones for Monetary and Financial Integration in ASEAN (Combined Study). The Combined Study 
aimed to critically and comprehensively assess financial sector regimes and the policy landscape in 
ASEAN, recommend a detailed financial integration milestones blueprint that shall lay out a comprehen-
sive program to achieve ASEAN financial integration by 2015, and recommend institutional and policy 
reforms to be implemented in 2011–2020. 
During the ASEAN Central Bank Governors’ Meeting held on 7 April 2011, the governors highlighted the 
imperative for financial integration to support regional economic integration to develop ASEAN into a 
leading growth region. Mindful of this, the governors accepted the results of the Combined Study as an 
important reference for ASEAN to further guide its financial integration process. 
This summary report reflects the views of ASEAN on the state of financial integration in the region, 
with inputs from the respective studies drafted by a team of consultants led by Prof. Yung Chul Park and 
was funded and supported by the Asian Development Bank under the regional technical assistance on 
Assessing the Financial Landscape and Formulating Milestones for Monetary and Financial Integration 
in ASEAN, Phase 2.
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vAbbreviations
AEC – ASEAN Economic Community
ACMF – ASEAN Capital Markets Forum
APN – ASEAN Payment Network
ASEAN – Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASEAN 5 –  Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (the original member states 
of ASEAN)
BCLMV –  Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and 
Viet Nam (the five newer member states of ASEAN)
CAL – capital account liberalization
CMD – capital market development
EU – European Union
FSL – financial services liberalization
GDP – gross domestic product
IMF – International Monetary Fund
Lao PDR – Lao People’s Democratic Republic
PCA – prompt corrective action
PSS – payment and settlement system
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WCPSS – ASEAN Working Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
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1I.  Introduction: Imperatives of  
Financial Integration
A new regional community is in the making in Southeast Asia. At the 12th Summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) in January 2007, the member countries 
affirmed their commitment to create the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by 2015 and “to 
transform ASEAN into a region with free move-
ment of goods, services, investment, and skilled 
labor, and freer flow of capital.” In creating the 
AEC, ASEAN will observe “the principles of an 
open, outward-looking, inclusive, and market-
driven economy consistent with multilateral rules 
as well as adherence to rules-based systems for 
effective compliance and implementation of 
economic commitments.” The formation of such a 
community will benefit from the successful liber-
alization of the capital account and the domestic 
financial market in individual countries, and from 
the ASEAN-wide integration of financial markets 
and institutions supported by regulatory harmo-
nization and the strengthening of policy coordi-
nation among the member states. 
Over the past 2 decades, ASEAN member states 
have made great strides in improving the effi-
ciency and soundness of their financial institutions 
and in developing money and capital markets. Yet, 
compared with their counterparts in advanced 
countries, ASEAN banks and other financial institu-
tions are not large enough in asset size to compete 
effectively against global players in international 
financial markets. Small, segmented, and illiquid, 
various financial markets in ASEAN are vulnerable 
to shocks from outside the region. Stringent regu-
lation of some cross-border financial transactions 
has also impeded ASEAN-wide financial integra-
tion. ASEAN must therefore place a high priority 
on speeding up and deepening regional financial 
integration to realize its continuing commitment 
to community building. 
This study suggests plans for capital account 
liberalization (CAL) and financial services liber-
alization (FSL) in the ASEAN banking sector, 
together with institutional and policy reforms and 
an ASEAN framework for policy coordination and 
mutual assistance over 2011–2020. It proposes 
financial integration targets and directions consis-
tent with the objectives of the ASEAN initiatives, 
identifies the required institutional and policy 
reforms, and describes the sequencing and time 
frame for the implementation of both CAL and 
FSL over the 10-year period.
The choice of target level and path of integration 
to be followed can be made from a wide range 
of options. This study considers full integration 
comparable to the level achieved by the core 
member countries of the European Union (EU) 
to be too ambitious for a 10-year period in view 
of the fact that it took the EU more than half a 
century to reach its current level of integration. 
The recent European financial crisis also provides 
important lessons on the challenges of such full 
integration. An alternative approach proposed in 
this study would be to allow financial integration 
in different member states to proceed at different 
speeds in order to build regional financial market 
infrastructure and harmonize institutions, market 
practices, and policies, and thus lay the founda-
tion for regional financial integration. 
In this study, planning for financial integration is 
guided by two reference frameworks for CAL and 
ASEAN-wide financial integration—one for the 
five original members (ASEAN 5) and another for 
the five newcomers (BCLMV).1
The plan proposes common objectives and a single 
end goal for all ASEAN member states, but with 
different timelines and milestones for each country 
1 The countries that compose ASEAN 5 are Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The BCLMV countries 
are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, and Viet Nam. 
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depending on its readiness in terms of the quality 
of its financial market infrastructure and financial 
standards of practice, the quality of its financial 
infrastructure, and its institutional capacity to 
implement reform. It also takes into account the 
gap between the ASEAN 5 and BCLMV states rela-
tive to the planned outcomes, and explores ways 
to narrow the gap over time. 
In drawing up the plans for FSL and CAL, this 
study reviews and consolidates the following 
ASEAN-specific initiatives and plans:
(i) those prepared by the ASEAN working 
committees on FSL, CAL, and CMD under 
the Roadmap for Monetary and Financial 
Integration of ASEAN;
(ii) the strategic schedule of the AEC Blueprint 
2015;
(iii) the banking sector master plans of individual 
member states; and
(iv) other official and private sector initiatives.
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3II. Where the Region Stands
2 The EU15 countries—the member countries of the EU before the accession of 10 other countries in 2004—were Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
and the United Kingdom. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/
detail.asp?ID=6805
A.  Economic Growth and  
Structural Change
D iversity is one major characteristic of the member states of ASEAN. They differ significantly in size, stage of develop-
ment, and industrial structure. For example, 
Indonesia, the largest economy in the region 
(with a nominal gross domestic product [GDP] of 
$546.5 billion in 2009), is almost 100 times the 
size of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
(Lao PDR), with a nominal GDP of $5.6 billion. 
For the past 10 years, the ASEAN member states 
have sustained rapid growth averaging 6.6% in 
2001–2009, almost twice the average GDP growth 
of the world economy. They have also managed 
reasonable price stability and accumulated sizable 
current account surpluses amounting to 6.8% of 
their combined GDP during the period.
Most ASEAN member states have chosen to 
pursue an export-oriented development strategy 
over the past several decades. This strategy has 
led to a large tradable sector: the ratio of total 
trade to GDP reached 103.6% in 2009. But despite 
the high degree of trade openness, the ASEAN 
member states do not trade among themselves as 
much as they do with other parts of the world. 
For example, intra-regional trade in ASEAN is 
estimated to be only 24.5% of the region’s total 
trade in 2009, compared with 49% in EU15.2 
With the rapid growth of the external sector and 
GDP, however, the share of intra-regional trade 
has increased, from 21.3% in 1994 to 24.5% 
in 2009. To a large extent, this increase reflects 
ASEAN’s active promotion of freer trade with its 
neighboring countries in recent years. ASEAN has 
concluded negotiations for five free trade agree-
ments with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Australia 
plus New Zealand. These trade agreements may 
further increase ASEAN’s intra-regional trade as a 
proportion of total trade.
B. Financial Landscape
1.  Financial Markets and Institutions 
Reflecting the diversity of their economies, some 
standard metrics of financial development—such 
as deposit money banks’ assets, stock market capi-
talization, and the value of bonds outstanding as 
a proportion of GDP—show considerable differ-
ences across ASEAN. These differences are largely 
associated with differences in the size of stock and 
bond markets. Financial institutions in ASEAN 
are generally classified into (i) banks, including 
commercial banks and special-purpose banks (or 
specialized financial institutions); (ii) nonbank 
financial institutions; and (iii) capital market–
related financial institutions. All three types of 
financial institutions are present in each of the 
ASEAN 5 states, but not in the BCLMV members.
a. Banking Institutions
Commercial banks are by far the most important 
type of financial institutions in ASEAN. Overall, 
they accounted for more than 82% of total finan-
cial assets in ASEAN in 2009. For the BCLMV, 
the share was even higher, at 98%. Commercial 
banks are supervised and regulated mainly by 
the central bank, whereas special-purpose banks 
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and nonbank financial institutions are regulated 
by different regulatory agencies. The average 
capital adequacy ratio of all ASEAN commercial 
banks was higher than 15% in 2009. The aver-
age nonperforming loan ratio of commercial 
banks in most of the member states was less than 
5%. These ratios suggest that, on average, most 
ASEAN banks meet the international standards 
for soundness and safety.
Measured in terms of assets, ASEAN banks are, on 
average, rather small on an international scale. 
The average size of assets of these banks amounted 
to $4.8 billion in 2009, far below the $14 billion 
in total assets of the world’s 500 largest commer-
cial banks. There are large differences in the size 
of banks across ASEAN: the average size is higher 
than $14 billion in Malaysia and Singapore, and 
almost $10 billion in Thailand, but it is less than 
$3 billion in other member states. 
The list of the top 500 commercial bank brands, 
as selected by Brand Finance of the United 
Kingdom, includes 24 ASEAN commercial banks. 
Of these 24 banks, only one is among the top 
global 100 commercial banks. In terms of market 
capital ization, only three Singaporean banks and 
one Malaysian bank rank among the world’s top 
100 banks. Moreover, the market capitalization of 
all of the 24 ASEAN commercial banks combined 
is smaller than that of Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China (ICBC), China Construction Bank, 
or Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation 
(HSBC). 
ASEAN needs to nurture globally competitive 
banks. The integration of ASEAN banking insti-
tutions will create an environment conducive 
to the emergence of such banks. It will build 
up a customer base large enough to support the 
growth of large competitive banks with a foothold 
in global banking through mergers and the acqui-
sition of small banks. 
b. Nonbank Financial Institutions
Nonbank and capital market–related financial 
institutions, except for insurance companies, are 
at an early stage of development, with limited 
intermediation capacity. Insurance companies are 
the only type of nonbank financial institution that 
is common across ASEAN, and even these differ 
in their main business activities from one member 
country to the other. Life insurance has a rela-
tively large market in ASEAN 5, whereas nonlife 
or general insurance dominates the insurance 
market in the BCLMV members.
Lending and borrowing by nonbank financial 
institutions, except for insurance companies, is 
often limited to a particular geographic area or 
a particular type of activity, such as financing for 
medium-sized companies. Their asset and liability 
management is subject to government regulations, 
and there are constraints on foreign competition. 
An exception is the insurance industry, which is 
substantially open to foreign investors. The aver-
age market share of foreign-owned and foreign-
controlled insurance companies is as high as 40% 
in some ASEAN member states. Yet, because of 
their small size and the complexity involved in 
designing and marketing insurance products, 
local companies have been unable to compete 
against large Western companies that have long 
penetrated the regional market. For this reason, it 
is difficult to find a local insurance company that 
operates in other ASEAN member states.
2. Regional Financial Integration 
a. Commercial Banks
ASEAN’s banking market has so far seen little 
integration. Although the ASEAN 5 states have 
taken steps to open up their banking industry, 
cross-border banking and the cross-border pene-
tration of ASEAN-based banks within ASEAN 
have been slow to develop. In 2010, not a single 
ASEAN-based commercial bank had either a 
branch or a subsidiary in all ASEAN member 
states. The three ASEAN banks with the widest 
regional presence (Maybank of Malaysia, Bangkok 
Bank of Thailand, and United Overseas Bank 
of Singapore) have operations in seven ASEAN 
member states. In contrast, global commer-
cial banks have a large presence in the region. 
Standard Chartered Bank has subsidiaries in 
seven member states and representative offices in 
three. Citibank and HSBC also have subsidiaries 
in seven member states. To compete effectively, 
ASEAN banks must develop financial resources 
and managerial capacity, meet international stan-
dards, and achieve similar levels of regional pene-
tration. Liberalization alone will not achieve the 
intended result of banking integration since some 
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ASEAN banks will still fall short of national regu-
latory standards compared with foreign banks.
b.  Portfolio Investment Flows among ASEAN 
Member States
Reflecting the gradual pace of financial integra-
tion, intra-ASEAN portfolio investments as a 
proportion of the region’s total investments have 
been relatively small. Among ASEAN 5, Singapore 
and Malaysia are the two largest portfolio inves-
tors, with 84.2% and 12.1% of the total intra-
ASEAN portfolio investments in 2009. Outward 
portfolio investments of ASEAN 5 within ASEAN 
more than tripled—from $103.6 million to $352.1 
million—between 2001 and 2009. Inward invest-
ments of these countries more than quadrupled 
over the same period, to $407.2 million. 
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The AEC is “the realization of the end goal of economic integration” as envisaged in Vision 2020, declared in 1997. It is “a 
stable, prosperous and highly competitive ASEAN 
economic region in which there is a free flow of 
goods, services and investments, a freer flow of 
capital, equitable economic development and 
reduced poverty and socio-economic disparities.” 
In establishing the AEC, ASEAN has agreed to 
adopt “the principles of an open, outward-looking, 
inclusive, and market-driven economy consistent 
with multilateral rules as well as adherence to 
rules-based systems for effective compliance and 
implementation of economic commitments.”
The AEC would be built on an integrated finan-
cial sector with safeguards to enhance regional 
economic integration and to accelerate regional 
economic growth. ASEAN-wide financial integra-
tion would proceed with the orderly implementa-
tion of FSL and CAL, supported by ASEAN-wide 
regulatory arrangements, including mechanisms 
for crisis prevention, management, and resolution 
and for ASEAN-linked payment.
In recognition of the diversity in economic 
and social backgrounds, a well-prepared and 
well-organized integration process would need 
to allow the member states to maintain orderly 
financial sector development as well as financial 
and socioeconomic stability.3 In this spirit, the 
member states would be guided by the following 
principles in pacing their financial liberalization:
(i) liberalization through the “ASEAN minus X” 
formula, where member states that are ready 
to liberalize can do so first and be joined by 
others later;
(ii) respect for national policy objectives and dif-
ferences in the level of economic and financial 
sector development among the member states;
(iii) flexibility of member states in setting their 
own preconditions for liberalization and 
establishing their own timelines; 
(iv) adherence to internationally recognized stan-
dards of financial regulation; and
(v) adoption of adequate safeguards against mac-
roeconomic instability and systemic risk that 
could arise from the liberalization process, 
including the right to uphold the regulatory 
discretion of the national authorities of mem-
ber states in taking the necessary measures.
3 ASEAN. 2007. ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. November.
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A. Threshold Conditions
F inancial liberalization theories and experi-ences in other emerging economies suggest that the individual member states of ASEAN 
would be better able to minimize the adverse 
impact of external shocks on the economy if 
they were to develop broad and liquid domestic 
financial markets and improve their efficiency 
and stability before embarking in earnest on 
financial market integration. For example, Kose, 
Prasad, and Taylor (2009) argue that countries 
that meet a number of threshold conditions are 
better able to reap the benefits of financial market 
integration.4
Some of these conditions are well-developed 
financial markets, high-quality institutions, good 
governance, sound macroeconomic policies, and 
trade integration. This study finds prevailing 
conditions below the threshold levels in some 
ASEAN member states. But this does not mean 
that these member states should delay their 
participation in the integration process. On the 
contrary, meeting the threshold conditions is part 
of the integration process. This is because success 
in CAL and FSL is predicated on success in build-
ing institutions and improving financial efficiency 
and stability. 
In preparing for FSL and CAL, this study follows 
the operational concept of financial integration 
and considers a financial market integrated if all 
potential participants face a single set of rules, 
have equal access to the market, and receive 
equal treatment when engaged in it. The most 
difficult and critical part of the integration process 
is getting the participating countries to agree on 
different timetables for different members and be 
prepared to implement liberalization measures at 
different stages. 
B.  Crisis Prevention and Resolution 
Mechanism
The 2008–2009 global financial crisis underscored 
the potential pitfalls of unfettered deregulation 
and premature opening of financial markets in 
emerging economies. It led to many proposals on a 
wide range of reforms in financial markets, institu-
tions, and regulatory systems, both regional and 
global. Compared with other regions, ASEAN has 
weathered the external financial shocks relatively 
well. Nevertheless, recent discussions at global 
forums, such as the G-20 and the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, suggest that it would be in 
the interest of ASEAN policy makers to consider 
the following:
(i) strengthening the ASEAN-wide safety net for 
liquidity support in addition to the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization;
(ii) reforming the financial sector to better meet 
the needs of members’ economies;
(iii) improving the system of evaluating and 
managing risk exposure at financial institutions;
(iv) building an ASEAN-wide early-warning 
system;
(v) harmonizing the regulatory systems of the 
individual member states; and
(vi) developing a framework for cross-border 
resolution of regional financial institutions.
As part of the effort to meet the preconditions, this 
study also places emphasis on building a number 
of regional institutions required to promote orderly 
integration. 
4 M. Ayhan Kose, Eswar S. Prasad, and Ashley Taylor. 2009. Thresholds in the Process of International Financial Integration. 
NBER Working Paper Series. No. 14916. Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research. April.
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8V.  Financial Services Liberalization: 
Milestones, Risks, and Challenges5
A.  Degree of Banking Market 
Integration in ASEAN
D espite ASEAN’s commitment to acceler-ate capital market development, it would be reasonable to assume—given the 
experiences of advanced economies—that most 
member states will still have bank-based financial 
systems for some time. The ratio of bank assets to 
GDP is expected to rise steadily, but it is unlikely 
to reach the current levels in Europe by 2030 if 
ASEAN does not exert more effort to integrate the 
national banking markets. 
The segmentation of banking markets in indi-
vidual member states is part of the reason for 
the industry’s slow pace of development. Several 
member states not only strictly regulate the entry 
of foreign banks but also impose restrictions on 
the operations of foreign banks in their domestic 
banking markets. 
To assess the current state of banking market 
integration in ASEAN, this study has estimated 
the market shares of domestic and foreign-based 
banks—ASEAN-based and non-ASEAN-based 
banks—in three member states for which data 
are available (Malaysia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand). The statistics show that, in 2009, 
domestic banks in these countries accounted for 
82% of the total commercial bank assets, on aver-
age, while the share of foreign banks was 18%. 
The share of ASEAN-based banks in Malaysia, at 
8.5%, was the highest among the three member 
states; the share was 0.4% in the Philippines and 
3.7% in Thailand.6
It is both natural and rational for ASEAN member 
states to prefer the entry into their domestic 
banking markets of large international banks 
with more advanced banking technology and a 
global network.
The experiences of other emerging economies, 
as well as advanced economies, show that the 
share of foreign banks tends to increase over time 
as the banks grow. A carefully planned market 
integration process can help more ASEAN-based 
banks develop faster than their non-ASEAN-
based counterparts. According to the estimation, 
if the integration plan proposed in this study is 
successfully implemented, the share of ASEAN-
based banks will begin to rise faster from 2015 
in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand— 
countries with rather high entry barriers—and 
will triple by 2025 or 2030.
B.  Barriers to ASEAN-Wide 
Banking Market Integration
In an integrated financial market, financial insti-
tutions and market participants operate under 
the same set of rules and regulations. ASEAN-
wide integration of the banking market requires 
a substantial degree of regulatory harmoniza-
tion among the member states, but instituting 
a uniform regulatory structure across a region 
with many sovereign states at different stages 
of development is a daunting task as it infringes 
on national sovereignty. To assess compatibil-
ity among the member states, this study divides 
regulatory systems into six categories, which have 
5 The recommendations on banking liberalization in this study are still under discussion by the Task Force on ASEAN Banking 
Integration Framework.
6 In comparison, foreign banks made up more than 60% of total commercial bank assets in Eastern Europe at the end of 2009.
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to do with (i) entry and licensing, (ii) capital 
stringency, (iii) supervision, (iv) empowerment 
of supervisors to take prompt corrective action, 
(v) restrictions on risk management procedures, 
and (vi) transparency. As expected, there are 
considerable differences not only between ASEAN 
5 and BCLMV countries but also among the coun-
tries within each group. The differences among 
ASEAN 5, however, are not as large as those 
among the BCLMV countries.
Many bank applications are also turned down for 
failure to pass the convenience and needs test 
than for any other reason. This test and the licens-
ing terms imposed by several member states, such 
as inclusion among the world’s top 200 banks 
in asset size, require the possession of highly 
advanced banking technology. Large, well-known 
international banks based in Western countries 
are more likely to lead in the development of 
advanced banking technology, and ASEAN-based 
banks are less likely to have similar level of devel-
opment in infrastructure or internal systems.
C.  Benefits and Risks of Banking 
Market Integration,  
and Safeguards
The integration of the banking market will 
substantially benefit ASEAN. First of all, an inte-
grated banking market will enlarge the customer 
base and create opportunities to reduce banking 
cost by increasing competition, achieving econo-
mies of scale, and improving efficiency. ASEAN 
banks will then be able to mobilize more savings 
through their network and allocate these to more 
productive investment, thereby increasing total 
factor productivity and accelerating growth.
Second, banking market integration will improve 
the stability of the ASEAN banking industry, as 
the emergence of regionally competitive banks 
and improvements in financial infrastructure will 
undoubtedly make the banking sector more resil-
ient and better able to respond efficiently to exter-
nal shocks. Likewise, banking market integration 
will promote closer cooperation among the indi-
vidual member states in the fight against poten-
tial threats to their economic stability.
In pushing for banking market integration, 
however, ASEAN policy makers must guard against 
potential risks. The entry of foreign banks could 
expose the domestic banking market to the spill-
over effects of difficulties encountered by these 
banks in their home countries. To forestall such 
adverse effects of banking integration, pruden-
tial requirements and regulatory frameworks 
should first be harmonized and made compliant 
with international standards, and information 
shared between the supervisors in the home and 
host countries. 
There is also the risk that the freedom to make 
cross-border transactions may embolden some of 
these new foreign entrants to engage in speculative 
activities that will increase the volatility of capi-
tal inflows into a specific member state, thereby 
destabilizing its economy. Hence, each member 
state must first set the necessary preconditions 
for CAL, as discussed in section VI, and the neces-
sary safeguards. Cooperation among the national 
supervisors and the established common interests 
may help relieve stability concerns. Such coopera-
tion may require the establishment of new regional 
arrangements that will perform surveillance and 
facilitation of information as collective responses 
to emergencies triggered by external shocks.
Finally, cross-border banking integration does not 
exclude the possibility that the domestic banking 
market will eventually be dominated by foreign 
banks. Many national supervisors may think that 
the stability of their domestic banking markets 
would be seriously threatened if domestic players 
were to be virtually replaced by foreign competi-
tion. This risk suggests that certain preconditions 
for entry liberalization may need to be put in place 
first and entry liberalized gradually as the precon-
ditions are met. For example, a few member states 
with less developed banking institutions could be 
allowed to liberalize access of foreign banks to its 
domestic market at a slower pace.
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D.  Strategy for Banking Industry 
Integration
1.  Financial Services Liberalization 
Strategy
This study proposes an FSL strategy built on 
the two pillars of regional financial integration: 
(i) the liberalization of the domestic banking 
market, and (ii) the building of regional financial 
market infrastructure. More specifically, this study 
foresees a two-track liberalization of cross-border 
wholesale banking and of cross-border entry of 
ASEAN banks within the region, supported by the 
regional harmonization of regulations.
With respect to cross-border banking, this study 
proposes that the member states immediately 
start phasing out most of the remaining restric-
tions on wholesale banking as part of CAL. It may, 
however, be prudent for ASEAN 5 to delay the 
completion of the liberalization of cross-border 
retail banking (deposit taking).
The opening of domestic banking markets to 
foreign banks, which this study deals with at 
length, will be carried out in an “ASEAN banking 
framework,” which gives preference to ASEAN 
banks so that they can take the lead in ASEAN 
finance in the future.
Regulatory harmonization and infrastructure 
building are discussed in section F.
E.  Three Dimensions of the  
Single Market
This study has developed a three-dimensional 
framework to guide the long process of finan-
cial services liberalization in ASEAN. Figure 1 
shows these dimensions (equal access, equal 
treatment, and equal environment) and their 
interrelationships. 
F.  The ASEAN Banking Framework
The ASEAN Banking Framework is designed 
to enable ASEAN banks to enter and operate in 
banking markets in other ASEAN member states, 
to eliminate discrimination against foreign banks, 
and to create a more consistent banking envi-
ronment throughout the region. The framework 
presents a plan for liberalization in each of the 
three dimensions of the single market presented 
in Figure 1. Figure 2 suggests that the target to be 
achieved by 2020 is not a fully integrated regional 
market but a semi-integrated one. To achieve 
significant progress by 2020, compromises must 
be made. First, only a small number of high-quality 
Figure 1: Three Dimensions of the Single Market
EQUAL ENVIRONMENT
Full regulatory
harmonization and
capacity building
Segmented
regional market
Elimination of 
discrimination
against foreign
institutions
Elimination of
entry barriers
Single, integrated
regional market
EQUAL TREATMENT
EQUAL ACCESS
Source: Asian Development Bank regional technical assistance project Combined Studies on Assessing 
the Financial Landscape and Formulating Milestones for Monetary and Financial Integration in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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banks that meet specific qualifications will gain 
access to the banking markets in all member 
states. Second, some within-market restrictions 
that may hinder free cross-border expansion will 
remain at the discretion of the host member state. 
Third, progress in the subdimension of regulatory 
harmonization will be slow, except in several key 
areas such as the criteria for prompt corrective 
action (PCA).
1. Equal Access
a. Entry
To promote the active penetration of the regional 
banking market by ASEAN-based banks, the 
member states should first agree on the conditions 
that ASEAN-based banks must meet to qualify. 
The qualifications must be sufficiently strin-
gent to relieve the prudential concerns of all the 
member states, and should include the following 
at a minimum: (i) capital adequacy requirements, 
(ii) consolidation requirements and authority for 
consolidated supervision, (iii) restrictions on large 
exposure, and (iv) accounting and transparency 
requirements. The ASEAN-based banks that satisfy 
all such qualifications are referred to in this study 
as qualified ASEAN banks (QABs). The member 
states should agree to facilitate QAB access to their 
respective domestic banking markets. 
The qualifications set for QABs would serve as 
benchmarks for regulatory harmonization in the 
banking industry to accelerate the integration of 
banking markets in the region. The stated quali-
fications could also serve as operating targets for 
other banks within the region to increase their 
financial strength and operating efficiency, and 
thereby accelerate capacity building within the 
region’s banking markets. 
b. Cross-Border Banking
The proposed entry liberalization plan is mainly 
centered on commercial banks. Given the differ-
ences in the nature of business between whole-
sale and retail banking, it is only reasonable to 
liberalize wholesale banking. The liberalization 
of market access should be implemented appro-
priately for market entry and cross-border bank-
ing activities. This means that QABs should be 
allowed to provide cross-border banking activities, 
which are subject to the relevant types of banking 
licensing category granted by the host country.
2. Equal Treatment
In allowing ASEAN-based banks to participate 
actively in domestic banking markets, regulators 
must take into account the intended activities of 
each bank and its capacity to manage the risks 
Figure 2: The ASEAN Banking Framework
EQUAL ENVIRONMENT
Regulatory
harmonization and
capacity building
Segmented
regional market
Substantial
reduction of
discrimination
against foreign
institutions
Two-tiered
licensing
regime
Semi–integrated
regional market
EQUAL TREATMENT
EQUAL ACCESS
Source: Asian Development Bank regional technical assistance project Combined Studies on Assessing 
the Financial Landscape and Formulating Milestones for Monetary and Financial Integration in the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
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to which it is exposed. The process of granting 
equal treatment to all banks, specifically in the 
matter of regulatory supervision, should be based 
on their risk profile. 
3. Equal Environment
a. Harmonization of Banking Regulations
While the harmonized licensing requirements during 
the initial stages of banking market integration 
could be based on the QAB qualifications, regional 
integration of the banking markets demands a 
consistent, if not uniform, regulatory environ-
ment throughout the region. Key areas of concern 
are the following: (i) bank accounting standards 
and disclosure requirements, (ii) minimum capital 
requirements, (iii) risk management, (iv) PCA and 
resolution methods for failed banks, (v) restrictions 
on large exposure, and (vi) anti-money-laundering 
and consumer protection regulations.
The prudential requirements for banks must be 
harmonized to prevent potential conflicts among 
national supervisors. Those requirements include 
(i) minimum PCA triggers (or a clear statement 
of PCA triggers in individual member states), 
(ii) accounting practices and disclosure require-
ments to ensure adequate transparency, (iii) asset 
and liability management restrictions to prevent 
regulatory arbitrage,7 and (iv) risk management 
regulations.8 However, national authorities are 
not precluded from seeking higher standards that 
are appropriate to their national context.
b. Institution Building
In a few member states with less developed bank-
ing markets or inadequate financial infrastructure, 
priority should be given to capacity building. For 
example, national credit rating agencies, credit 
guarantee facilities, and interbank lending and 
borrowing markets must be established before 
a country can begin in earnest to ease entry 
barriers. This suggests that a uniform timeline 
cannot be imposed on all member states, and 
that the liberalization of banking services should 
depend on the progress made in the development 
of the individual countries’ banking market and 
other financial infrastructure. 
It is worth emphasizing the importance of joint 
efforts among the member states to create a 
consistent banking environment within the 
region. “Joint efforts” are not taken to mean 
that all member states are expected to contrib-
ute equally. Member states that lag behind in the 
development of domestic banking markets may 
find it difficult to establish critical infrastruc-
ture in time for the prompt integration of the 
regional banking market. In such cases, assis-
tance and cooperation from other member states 
would significantly improve the prospects for 
timely integration.
7 Key areas of concern are (i) restrictions on investments in corporate stocks, bonds, and real estate; (ii) deposit interest rates 
and types of deposit accounts; and (iii) restrictions on lending to specific sectors or industries.
8 For example, national supervisors should discuss the feasibility of adopting uniform Basel III capital adequacy rules and of 
harmonizing leverage restrictions and liquidity provisions.
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VI. Capital Account Liberalization
A.  Need for Freer Capital Mobility  
in ASEAN
Capital account liberalization (CAL) is an essential aspect of any efforts to create an integrated economic region. Free capi-
tal mobility is a fundamental pillar of economic 
convergence, as it allows savings from the more 
developed economies to help support growth in 
developing economies by lowering the cost of capi-
tal. In the context of ASEAN, this means that an 
economic agent in any member state is allowed 
to invest in or borrow funds freely from any other 
member state according to economic consider-
ations alone, and that no legal or administrative 
formalities are imposed on the movement of capi-
tal within ASEAN. Even if capital is substantially 
allowed to move across national borders, as is the 
case in many ASEAN countries, capital mobility is 
still considered not free if it is subject to control in 
the form of permission, ex ante reporting require-
ments, or quantity restrictions even if permission 
is generally granted. Capital is not freely mobile 
when there is a lag between the time a decision 
is made to transfer funds abroad and the time the 
transfer can be made. CAL is therefore defined as 
a process of dismantling legal and administrative 
impediments to the freedom with which economic 
agents can transfer ownership claims across 
national borders.
There is a compelling economic case for free 
capital mobility in ASEAN. First, it aids in the 
efficient allocation of the region’s large savings 
across national borders, and therefore promotes 
economic growth and welfare. Though there is 
little conclusive empirical evidence to link free 
capital mobility with faster economic growth, 
recent academic research points to the impor-
tance of the quality of institutions in determin-
ing the growth-enhancing effect of international 
capital flows. In particular, recent evidence 
suggests that financial depth and institutional 
quality are the two most important preconditions 
for a positive effect of foreign capital inflows on 
economic growth. 
ASEAN is a highly open trading region, with most 
member states having made remarkable econom ic 
achievements in recent decades through an open- 
door policy. The literature generally considers 
trade openness, and trade liberalization that 
typically precedes it, to be an important thresh-
old condition for CAL. The classical literature on 
the order of economic liberalization argues that 
if the capital account is liberalized before trade, 
foreign capital may come into a protected sector 
with no comparative advantage, and thus create 
a real distortion. Trade openness, moreover, helps 
reduce any negative costs of capital mobility. 
Economies that are more open to trade face less 
risk from sudden stops or reversals of capital 
inflows because they are in a better position to 
service external obligations through export reve-
nues and are less likely to default. They will also 
require a more modest real exchange rate depre-
ciation for a given current account adjustment in 
the event of a sudden stop. Given the background 
of trade openness, therefore, ASEAN as a region 
is well positioned to liberalize the capital account 
further and to gain from such measures to encour-
age greater financial integration.
Most critically, the freedom of capital to move 
across borders is a prerequisite for the creation of 
a single ASEAN market. The aim of the AEC is to 
transform ASEAN into a single market and produc-
tion base, characterized by “free movement of 
goods, services, investment, skilled labor, and freer 
flow of capital.” This goal, which involves the free 
or freer movement of factors of production, cannot 
be achieved without substantial CAL. Capital 
mobility promotes further regional trade integra-
tion by facilitating payment for current transac-
tions through cross-border lending and borrowing. 
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Free movement of investment presupposes the abil-
ity to transfer funds across borders. Free movement 
of skilled labor also necessitates ease in transfer-
ring funds from one country to another for a range 
of purposes, as the sphere of economic activities 
becomes increasingly regional. Freer movement 
of capital must therefore accompany the concur-
rent efforts to allow the free movement of goods, 
services, investment, and skilled labor.
CAL has a critical role in ASEAN financial integra-
tion, as it complements financial services liber-
alization. First, CAL promotes financial sector 
development, as well as capital market develop-
ment, by increasing the volume of gross cross-
border capital flows. Volume—promoted by 
two-way capital flows made possible by lower 
transaction costs—is a critical element of deeper 
and more liquid national and regional markets. 
Second, CAL facilitates the integration of ASEAN 
banking markets. The freedom of banks to operate 
in another national market in ASEAN is only one 
dimension of FSL. In fact, allowing greater free-
dom for banks to borrow and lend across borders 
can also facilitate FSL. For example, a liberalized 
capital account regime would allow residents to 
hold foreign currency deposits with banks located 
in foreign countries. From the point of view of 
the banks, this is a way of funding their opera-
tions from foreign sources. An integrated banking 
market allows greater freedom for cross-border 
banking flows, which in turn enhances their ability 
to engage in various financial transactions freely 
across all member states. Thus, FSL and CAL are 
two sides of the creation of an integrated financial 
market.
B.  Pace and Sequencing of Capital 
Account Liberalization
The first step in building an implementation plan 
for CAL is assessing the capital account regime 
of individual ASEAN member states. The assess-
ment done for this study suggests several impor-
tant observations. First, though a few member 
states are highly open, there still remain some 
restrictions on capital flows for macro-pruden-
tial reasons. Second, most of the controls are 
on outflows than on inflows. Third, although 
all member states except one have accepted the 
obligations under Article VIII of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement, many 
still maintain current account–related payment 
restrictions, such as repatriation or surrender 
requirements for export proceeds and the verifi-
cation procedures for service payments. Fourth, 
almost all member states have some restrictions 
on the offshore use of their currencies. Fifth, 
many member states place restrictions on exter-
nal borrowing than on portfolio inflows, and 
many place some restrictions on external lend-
ing, especially in their national currencies. Sixth, 
many member states limit the ability of investors 
to hedge foreign currency risks, including the use 
of derivative transactions. Finally, a few member 
states impose withholding tax on interest income 
and capital gains from certain types of securities.
To be sure, CAL entails risks, especially given the 
volatile nature of global capital flows. Although 
how the risks of capital inflows is measured is 
a complex issue, this study proposes that the 
following three types of risks be considered, at 
least conceptually:
(i) Macroeconomic risks. Capital inflows could 
accelerate the growth of credit, cause the real 
exchange rate to appreciate, create inflation-
ary pressure, expand domestic demand, and 
affect other macroeconomic variables in a 
way inconsistent or incompatible with the 
immediate domestic policy objectives, such 
as price stability, exchange rate stability, and 
export. If fiscal policy positively responds to 
the increase in revenue, it could result in an 
overheating of the economy.
(ii) Financial stability risk. Capital inflows could 
push up equity, real estate, and other asset 
prices, reduce the quality of assets (e.g., increase 
nonperforming loans on the balance sheets of 
banks), and adversely affect the maturity and 
currency composition of the balance sheets 
of the private sector, thereby contributing to 
greater financial fragility. Recent experience 
suggests that the impact of capital inflows on 
asset prices has been particularly significant.
(iii) Risk of capital flow reversal. Capital inflows 
could reverse themselves suddenly, with the 
potential for the depletion of reserves or sharp 
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currency depreciation. It is mainly to mitigate 
this crisis risk that many countries in Asia have 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves as a 
form of self-insurance in recent years.
The idea that CAL must be managed properly to 
minimize these risks while maximizing the bene-
fits forms the basis of the new orthodoxy that 
emerged in the aftermath of the financial crises of 
the late 1990s. The policy-oriented literature that 
has largely been developed at the IMF stresses the 
importance of an “integrated” approach, which 
considers CAL as part of a more comprehensive 
program of economic reform and coordinates it 
with appropriate macroeconomic and exchange 
rate policies, as well as with policies to strengthen 
the financial system. In this approach, emphasis 
is placed on the sequence in which the necessary 
preconditions—including the system of pruden-
tial supervision—are to be established and the 
various components of the capital account are to 
be liberalized.
Keeping in mind the existing ASEAN frameworks, 
including the AEC Strategic Schedule (through 
2015), the ASEAN Capital Markets Forum (ACMF) 
Implementation Plan (through 2015), and the 
Working Committee on CAL Work Plan (through 
2015), this study proposes the following building 
blocks for creating CAL implementation plans for 
individual member states:
(i) Current account and foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI)–related measures should be liber-
alized as quickly as is practical, in accordance 
with the AEC Strategic Schedule on Freer 
Flows of Capital. Note that some of the 
existing current account and FDI-related 
restrictions, repatriation requirements in 
particular, while macro-prudential in nature, 
can also be viewed as a form of control on 
capital outflows.
(ii) Restrictions on capital inflows should be 
removed. Given the already high degree of de 
facto openness in several countries (usually 
through purchases of domestic securities by 
nonresidents), removing impediments to 
inflows in these countries should not create 
additional risks.
(iii) Restrictions on outflows should also 
be removed at the early stage of the 
process—first with respect to other ASEAN 
countries, through the mutual recognition 
principle, and eventually to all countries. 
A distinction can be made in the process 
between non-retail and retail investors in 
specific instances. While the liberalization 
of outflows can be a gradual process for 
lower-income countries, it should receive 
high priority for higher-income countries, 
especially ASEAN 5.
(iv) Enabling environment, including ease of 
use of currency, ease of hedging, removal 
of withholding tax, and freedom of per-
sonal transactions, can be created at a later 
stage. Restrictions for some or all of these 
categories may be retained as a safeguard 
measure. This study does not propose that 
these restrictions be removed totally, even 
in 2020.
It should be noted that this approach differs from 
conventional wisdom, which suggests that the 
liberalization of outflows should come after the 
liberalization of inflows. But this conventional 
wisdom would not work in the case of ASEAN 
because regional financial integration is a two- 
way process. Outflows must therefore be liberal-
ized early in the process, along with inflows, to 
facilitate financial integration. In promoting capital 
outflows in an orderly manner, the principle of 
mutual recognition can be invoked to promote 
outflows within the region without violating the 
global rule of nondiscrimination while containing 
the associated risks, especially (at this stage) with 
respect to equity flows. 
C.  Management of Capital Flows 
through Sound Policies  
and Safeguard Measures
Once the capital account is substantially open, the 
ability of countries to use conventional macro-
economic and structural policies to deal with 
surges in capital inflows becomes limited, short of 
allowing the currency to appreciate or depreciate 
when there are reversals. Given these limitations, 
policy makers may want to retain more direct 
instruments to influence the volatility of capital 
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inflows or to have devices to intervene in the 
free flow of capital when necessary. These instru-
ments can broadly be referred to as safeguard 
measures. However, it is critical to remember 
that any safeguard measures, if adopted, should 
not interfere with the free flow of capital during 
normal times. Safeguard measures, broadly 
defined, could include (i) sound and consistent 
macroeconomic policies, including exchange 
rate policy; (ii) routine administrative mecha-
nisms, including macro-prudential measures; and 
(iii) capital controls.
1.  Sound and Consistent  
Macroeconomic Policies
The best strategy for living with an open capital 
account is to pursue sound macroeconomic poli-
cies. Such policies, characterized by price stability 
and fiscal discipline, are the proven way to mini-
mize vulnerability to sudden reversals of capital 
flows. Countries pursuing sound macroeconomic 
policies would be better able to prevent an asset 
bubble from occurring when there is a surge in 
capital inflow. Such countries are less likely to 
be subject to (but are not completely immune 
to) a speculative attack when investor sentiment 
creates vulnerability to crisis. When the economic 
fundamentals are strong, the adverse impact of 
a sudden flight of capital can be more manage-
able. Fiscal discipline is especially critical. Equally 
important is following a consistent macroeco-
nomic policy. Given the binding constraints of 
the so-called “impossible trinity,” the commit-
ment to freer capital mobility within the region 
may increasingly mean that the government of 
an ASEAN member state must choose between a 
stable exchange rate and an independent mone-
tary policy. The policy mix of a stable exchange 
rate and independent monetary policy will 
become increasingly difficult to maintain.
Administrative mechanisms. Until domestic 
financial markets become sufficiently deep and 
risk management skills fully developed, there 
could be routine administrative mechanisms, 
including prudential regulations, to safeguard 
the financial system from the potential adverse 
impact of capital flow volatility. Many of these 
measures are different from capital controls, to 
the extent that they do not discriminate between 
residents and nonresidents, apply according to 
the currency of the flow or the type of institutions, 
or are placed only for monitoring purposes. Some 
are forms of capital control, intended to regulate 
some types of flows that are considered not intrin-
sic to productive economic activities. The CAL 
implementation plans that this study proposes 
incorporate safeguard measures. One is the reten-
tion of restrictions on the cross-border trading of 
forwards and derivatives, as well as on offshore 
currency use. Although lifting these restrictions 
would help increase the depth of cross-border 
transactions, the removal of these restrictions is 
not considered essential to achieving the aim of 
AEC, at least over the medium term. The other 
safeguard measures for the implementation 
plans is the application of the mutual recognition 
principle to the liberalization, in particular of 
capital outflows. This is intended to manage the 
volume of outflows, at least initially, by making 
it easier to purchase foreign assets issued by an 
ASEAN entity.
Examples of other safeguard mechanisms that 
ASEAN policy makers could consider adopting 
include (i) requiring routine ex post reporting, 
(ii) requiring cross-border flows to be effected 
through authorized domestic intermediaries, 
(iii) requiring transactions to be registered with 
the central bank, (iv) placing limits on the open 
foreign exchange positions of banks and corpora-
tions, and (v) allowing differential reserve require-
ments on foreign currency deposits. Prudential 
regulations aimed at domestic institutions, such 
as tighter loan-loss provisions and capital require-
ments (e.g., with respect to external lending), 
could also serve as a safeguard measure. Some 
of these measures are already in place in many of 
the ASEAN countries. The ASEAN member states 
must understand that these and possibly other 
measures are legitimate tools of prudential capi-
tal flow management and should not be consid-
ered a restriction on capital flows even when their 
outcome is similar to that of capital controls.
Those administrative measures need to be timely 
and targeted for them to be effective. This requires 
good and timely understanding of the nature of 
the capital flows. Thus, building a capacity to 
effectively monitor capital flows is a precondi-
tion in liberalizing the capital account. The criti-
cal yardstick is whether a particular measure 
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interferes with the freedom of economic agents to 
transfer funds across national borders according 
to economic considerations alone. It bears empha-
sizing that routine ex post reporting requirements 
are not the same as ex ante reporting require-
ments. One is not a restriction on the freedom of 
capital flows, but the other is. Economic agents 
should be allowed to make capital transactions 
freely without being required to report them at 
the same time or in advance of the transactions 
they are making. In this respect, to be required 
to report them after the fact—say, within 30 days 
of the time such transactions take place—is not a 
restriction on their freedom to make the transac-
tions. However, to be required to obtain permis-
sion is a restriction on free capital mobility even 
when there is a presumption that such permission 
is routinely granted. These considerations should 
guide the choice of such safeguard measures.
2. Capital Controls
In emergency situations, countries with an other-
wise open capital account have experimented 
with the use of direct controls on inflows. Most 
recently, Thailand (in December 2006) and Brazil 
(in 2009) have introduced capital controls to 
stem the tide of capital inflows and the result-
ing appreciation pressure on the currency. These 
recent controls have typically taken the form of 
unremunerated reserve requirements (URRs) 
that mandate a certain percentage of inflows to 
be deposited with the central bank for a given 
period of time. These measures also tend to be 
temporary, as the countries have previously been 
the beneficiaries of substantial capital inflows and 
do not have the option of permanently withdraw-
ing from integration to the international financial 
system. The controls are lifted when the trigger-
ing situation ceases to exist.
URRs are different from conventional controls in 
at least three respects. First, URRs are designed 
for a country with an otherwise open capi-
tal account, to manage—not prevent—capital 
inflows. Second, they work on capital inflows 
not through administrative means but through 
the price incentives of international investors. 
Third, the amount of “tax” on capital inflows is 
negatively related to the length of the invest-
ment. Hence, URRs are more effective on short-
term and presumably on more speculative flows, 
than on long-term flows that are believed to be 
driven more by fundamental economic factors. 
For these reasons, URRs are considered to be less 
distortionary and abrasive, and have received 
support even from some advocates of freer 
capital mobility.
There is a large body of empirical literature on 
the effectiveness of URRs based on the experi-
ence of Chile in the 1990s. The results remain 
inconclusive, not only because they are sensitive 
to the choice of methodology, as in any empiri-
cal work, but more importantly because URRs 
were endogenous to the volume of capital flows. 
Broad consensus, however, seems to be that 
URRs (i) reduced the volume of capital inflows 
in the short run, but lost effectiveness over time; 
(ii) lengthened the maturity of inflows; (iii) were 
effective in raising relative domestic interest rates 
but not in preventing real exchange rate appre-
ciation; and (iv) had greater (adverse) impact 
on small and medium-sized firms (which rely on 
bank borrowing) than on large firms with access 
to a wider range of financing instruments.
Despite the lack of empirical support for the effec-
tiveness of capital controls, there is no reason to 
exclude their use a priori as an option. Economic 
theory suggests that the demand for a good falls 
when the price rises. Because capital controls 
raise the cost of making a transaction, the volume 
of transactions would fall unless the controls are 
not enforced. A recent IMF study provides argu-
ments to support the use of capital controls if the 
economy is operating near potential, the level 
of reserves is adequate, the exchange rate is not 
undervalued, and the flows are likely to be tran-
sitory.9 For capital controls to be effective as a 
safeguard measure, it is important to enhance the 
central bank’s administrative capacity. Empirical 
evidence suggests that capital controls tend to 
be more effective in industrial countries than in 
developing countries, presumably reflecting the 
difference in administrative capacity. Some of the 
safeguard measures proposed above can enhance 
9 Jonathan D. Ostry, Atish R. Ghosh, Karl Habermeier, Marcos Chamon, Mahvash S. Qureshi, and Dennis B. S. Reinhardt. 2010.
Capital Inflows: The Role of Controls. IMF Staff Position Note. SPN/10/04. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
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the ability of governments to introduce capital 
controls with some effectiveness in an emergency 
situation.
3. Regional Cooperation
Regional cooperation per se is not a safeguard 
measure, but it can enhance the effectiveness 
of a safeguard measure adopted by individual 
countries. After all, ASEAN CAL is a regional 
initiative and therefore requires regional coop-
eration to succeed. First and foremost, ASEAN 
could agree on the definition of what is and what 
is not a restriction. It is reasonable to consider 
in this respect any measures that require official 
intervention (be it permission, reporting, or 
notification) ahead of a planned transaction 
to be a restriction. Second, ASEAN could agree 
that a member state has the right to introduce an 
emergency measure in extraordinary conditions. 
Emergency measures could include an adminis-
trative suspension of (certain types of) normal 
capital flows, temporary capital inflow controls 
(e.g., URRs), and exit levies. Third, to make this 
agreement operational, ASEAN could also agree 
as to what constitutes an extraordinary condition.
Regional cooperation makes it possible to manage 
capital flows more effectively. A regional system of 
surveillance (including an early warning system) 
and mutual financial support (such as the ASEAN 
Swap Arrangement, the Chiang Mai Initiative 
Multilateralization, or the network of bilateral 
swap arrangements) would allow individual 
countries to proceed with CAL with greater confi-
dence. It is possible that the ASEAN CAL process 
could lead to greater macroeconomic policy coop-
eration among ASEAN member countries.
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VII. Financial Infrastructure Building
A. Capacity Building
I f financial integration is to succeed, the ASEAN financial regulatory agencies must be adequately equipped with relevant software 
and hardware. By software is meant the human 
resource capacity to monitor and manage domes-
tic financial market deregulation under the new 
environment of an integrated ASEAN financial 
market. By hardware is meant the legal, tax, and 
regulatory systems that are required to support 
the financial market infrastructure.
ASEAN member states have two options in build-
ing human resource capacity. The first is to build a 
new institution. The second option is to use exist-
ing regional training and research institutes such 
as the South East Asian Central Banks Research 
and Training Centre (SEACEN Centre) and the 
ASEAN Insurance Training and Research Institute 
(AITRI), both in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It is 
more cost-effective to use the training services of 
these agencies.
With respect to the hardware side of capacity 
building, it must be borne in mind that developing 
countries often do not have sufficient resources to 
build their own infrastructure. Thus, there must be 
an organized program of development assistance, 
first from the more developed member states of 
ASEAN, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Thailand. In addition, ASEAN should request 
systematic assistance from the Plus-3 countries 
of the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the 
Republic of Korea, and from regional and interna-
tional institutions, such as the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the World Bank.
B. Consumer Protection
Consumer protection systems for financial 
services are not well developed in a few ASEAN 
countries. According to a recent World Bank 
report, Financial Access 2010: the State of Financial 
Inclusion through the Crisis, ASEAN ranks lower 
than other neighboring regions of South Asia or 
Central Asia in consumer protection systems, such 
as the legal framework, institutional structure, 
and dispute resolution mechanisms. ASEAN 
should make a concerted effort to build a well- 
developed consumer protection system. To this 
end, ASEAN should adopt and enforce stan-
dardized and harmonized laws and regulations 
on consumer protection applicable to all member 
states.
C.  Mechanism for Monitoring 
Financial Market Integration
If financial integration is to succeed, careful 
attention needs to be paid to (i) how the integra-
tion process is designed and (ii) how the agreed 
integration plan is actually implemented. A mech-
anism should be created to monitor the progress 
of financial integration in ASEAN—that is, an 
agency responsible for monitoring the progress 
in ASEAN financial market integration and for 
reporting its assessment to the regulatory author-
ities of the ASEAN member states, such as the 
central banks and finance ministries. 
Three options are available for building such a 
mechanism: (i) the ASEAN Secretariat could take up 
this work; (ii) existing ASEAN mechanisms, such as 
a working group or committee, could be expanded; 
or (iii) an entirely new organization could be built. 
This study recommends a combination of the first 
and third options. For example, one possibility might 
be to create a division or department within the 
ASEAN Secretariat. This is cost-effective compared 
with the alternative of building an entirely new 
organization. At the same time, additional financial 
experts should be hired for the ASEAN Secretariat. 
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The work of the monitoring unit for financial inte-
gration can also be expected to benefit from the 
buildup of experience within the ASEAN Secretariat 
in monitoring the progress of integration in the 
general services sector.
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VIII.  ASEAN Payment and 
Settlement System
A. Introduction
A n efficient payment system is vital in strength-ening the link among ASEAN members and supporting integration objectives under the 
AEC Blueprint 2015 and beyond. ASEAN coordi-
nates its efforts in payment and settlement system 
(PSS) development by focusing on five key elements: 
(i) policy, (ii) legal framework, (iii) instrument, 
(iv) institution, and (v) infrastructure.10 With these 
elements in mind, studies were conducted on five 
specific areas of PSS to determine areas for future 
enhancement, development, and harmonization. 
The five areas were (i) cross-border trade settlement, 
(ii) cross-border money remittance, (iii) cross-border 
retail payment systems, (iv) cross-border capital 
market settlement, and (v) standardization. These 
initiatives are aimed at improving the domestic 
payment infrastructure, promoting cross-border 
payment services that are more efficient than existing 
arrangements, and ultimately achieve the integration 
of systems in the region.
B. Key Findings
For each of the five PSS areas, a study was carried 
out to understand the current and expected 
conditions, identify gaps, and propose recom-
mendations for dealing with the gaps. The 
following key findings from each study represent 
areas where improvements could be made:
(i) Trade settlement. The existing correspon-
dent banking mechanism is adequate to 
accommodate demand. However, there are 
opportunities for improvements that would 
raise the efficiency of cross-border trade settle-
ment in ASEAN by reducing foreign exchange 
spread and bank charges, and develop 
integrated regional payment infrastructure 
to support faster availability of funds.
(ii) Money remittance. Nonstandardized remit-
tance channels exist and efficiency levels 
vary. Further, informal nonregulated channels 
make consumer protection difficult.
(iii) Retail payment systems. Domestic retail 
payment systems in some countries are still 
fragmented, resulting in non-interoperability 
among different providers. Inefficiency in 
payment systems and opaque pricing mecha-
nisms make cross-border payments costly.
(iv) Capital market settlement. Varying market 
practices exist, and they hinder the cross-border 
settlement of capital market transactions.
(v) Standardization. Many ASEAN members 
have adopted various standards, which 
might make PSS non-interoperable and inter- 
linkage more costly. Therefore, central banks 
would play a central role in promoting 
standardization to enable interoperability 
and inter-linkage among PSS. Also, there 
is a need for greater sharing of expertise 
among members.
C. Categories of Goals
To overcome the challenges presented in the 
above findings, each of the five studies recom-
mended solutions that the ASEAN member 
10 In April 2010, the ASEAN Central Bank Governors Meeting endorsed the establishment of the ASEAN Working Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems with the broad aim of identifying areas of improvement in ASEAN countries that require the 
development of payment and settlement systems and drawing up recommendations for the member countries, where relevant.
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countries could undertake, either individually or 
as a group. A common theme across the studies 
was the need to promote the adoption of common 
standards that would enable interoperability and 
inter-linkage among the various payment instru-
ments and infrastructure, and would in turn 
improve cross-border payment and settlement. 
Three broad categories of goals were therefore 
identified to be prioritized as follows: 
(i) Standardizing systems. It was recognized in 
all studies that a variety of standards and sys-
tems are in place within each member state. 
To facilitate efficient cross-border payment 
and settlement, the first step would be to 
adopt common best practices and standards 
across systems. Such standards could be tech-
nical standards, market practices, or regula-
tory standards. Regulatory standards, such as 
adequate legislation and policy, may be easier 
to achieve and hence would be classed as 
short-term goals, while other standards, such 
as electronic messaging, might have to follow 
medium-term infrastructure development. 
The key short-term goal, therefore, would be 
identifying common standards for ASEAN to 
adopt. Standardization will form the founda-
tion for all future PSS development and is 
thus the foremost goal.
(ii) Improving existing infrastructure and 
payments environment. The studies also 
recognized the fact that PSS in member coun-
tries are at different stages of development 
and thus have different requirements. It is 
acknowledged that the development of new 
systems could be potentially costly for some 
members. To minimize costs, the studies 
recommended that members, particularly 
those with less developed domestic PSS, 
should focus on improving their PSS to meet 
their economic needs. In doing so, members 
could take the opportunity to standardize 
their systems and be ready for the long-term 
goal of regional integration. It follows that a 
needs analysis, possibly in the form of a score-
card, to determine what best fits the needs 
of individual members should be conducted 
immediately for each of the five study areas.
(iii) Exploring the option of PSS linkages within 
ASEAN. In the long term (beyond 2015), 
ASEAN would reach a state where common 
standards are in place and members’ PSS 
would be fairly developed. In such an envi-
ronment, the ASEAN countries could seek 
to link their PSS and even connect to inter-
national systems. Full integration across the 
region would be the long-term goal. In the 
meantime, the member countries could study 
the feasibility of smaller-scale pilot initiatives 
that could form the basis for reaching that 
long -term goal.
To achieve these goals, ASEAN members should 
strive to support each other’s development 
through capacity building or technical assistance. 
Also, ASEAN is cognizant of the fact that PSS play 
a supportive role to other developments in the 
economy, particularly under the AEC Blueprint 
2015. Hence, rather than being rushed by arbi-
trary timelines, the ASEAN has deliberately taken 
a longer-term view of developments (beyond 
2015) to ensure that initiatives are carefully 
aligned with real economic needs. The timelines 
indicated in this study are therefore guidelines 
rather than hard targets that must be met. 
D. Road Map
1.  Short-Term to Midterm 
Recommendations (2012–2013): 
Standardization
Individual studies have identified many areas of 
PSS that require greater standardization, formal-
ization, and harmonization. International stan-
dards exist for some areas, while in other areas, it 
would fall upon the ASEAN members to identify 
best practices as a benchmark for services in the 
region. One key outcome of the standardization 
study is the recommendation that ASEAN should 
look to adopt ISO 20022 for PSS, for financial 
services to allow more seamless integration in the 
future. The other recommendations for the short 
term to midterm are as follows:
a. Cross-Border Trade Settlement
The standardization study proposed more trans-
parency in the disclosure of bank charges (such 
as foreign exchange spread and handling fees) 
for cross-border banking. Greater disclosure of 
charges will reduce the cost of intra-ASEAN trade, 
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particularly when transactions are done in foreign 
exchange. The region would benefit from lower 
local-currency transaction costs as a result of 
the availability of more information and greater 
competition among banks.
b. Money Remittances
The standardization study also proposed the 
adoption of policies to promote the use of formal, 
regulated channels, as well as greater trans-
parency of remittance charges, to strengthen 
consumer protection. Central banks could encour-
age the participation of regulated nonbank remit-
tance service providers, which could enter into 
unbanked rural areas.
c. Retail Payments
The standardization study highlighted the 
need for central banks to promote the adop-
tion of common (international) standards in 
retail payment systems as the foundation for 
interoperability between retail payment systems 
in the region. Moreover, to increase efficiency 
and to widen the use of payment instruments, 
central banks might facilitate the development 
of commonly used instruments under a regional 
scheme for retail payment systems. To ensure 
the effectiveness of the initiative, joint research 
among central banks could be useful.
d. Capital Market Settlement
The standardization study proposed the adoption 
of international standards for straight-through 
processing in domestic and cross-border settle-
ments, and the introduction of risk-mitigating 
measures such as delivery-versus-payment and 
payment-versus-payment settlement if these are 
absent in certain domestic markets.
As mentioned in an earlier section, the immedi-
ate short-term goal should be to conduct a needs 
analysis that takes into account the varying states 
of the existing standards, infrastructure, and envi-
ronment in each member’s country. Members can 
then align their needs to the foregoing recom-
mendations, and work toward achieving the 
longer-term goals without incurring excessive 
costs. The needs analysis should be done for each 
member across the five study areas. 
2.  Midterm to Long-Term 
Recommendations (2014–2015): 
Infrastructure and Environment 
Improvement
In the medium term, when ASEAN has achieved 
some degree of standardization in the various 
areas, the member countries could work toward 
further improvements in PSS and market prac-
tices, in alignment with their needs, based on 
the outcome of the needs analysis. Specific initia-
tives include moving toward T+1 receipt of funds 
and improving infrastructure by establishing 
or expanding links in existing payment systems 
(e.g., the ASEAN Payment Network [APN]). The 
midterm to long-term recommendations for each 
study area are as follows:
a. Cross-Border Trade Settlement
It was recommended that ASEAN study possible 
mechanisms for achieving T+1 receipt of funds 
for cross-border payments. Also recommended 
was the promotion of local-currency settlement of 
trade through bilateral linkages among ASEAN 5 
countries, in line with the relaxation by member 
states of access to domestic currencies.
b. Money Remittances
ASEAN should explore the feasibility of using 
existing regional networks (e.g., APN) for money 
remittances and expanding their reach to other 
member countries.
c. Retail Payment Systems
ASEAN should continue facilitating the expansion 
of products for retail payment, including not only 
ATM cards but also debit and credit cards, as well 
as money remittance and other services provided 
by the existing regional network.
d. Capital Market Settlement
ASEAN should assist the ACMF and the Working 
Committee on Capital Market Development with 
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their implementation plans. ASEAN may have to 
help study various options for establishing regional 
infrastructure for capital market settlement.
3.  Long-Term Recommendations 
(Beyond 2015): Exploring ASEAN 
Payment and Settlement System  
(PSS) Linkages 
A midterm goal identified by ASEAN is the 
achievement of T+1 for the receipt of funds 
across PSS within the region. In the longer term, 
the goal might be to achieve same-day funds 
transfer within the region. This long-term goal 
would ultimately require linkages to be formed 
between the various payment systems, be they 
for retail payments, trade settlement, or money 
remittances. At that point, the region is expected 
to have enhanced or developed systems that are 
interoperable since they adopt similar standards. 
What remains to be done is to determine the 
form of linkages within ASEAN for each PSS 
area; this would constitute the long-term work 
goal of the ASEAN Working Committee on 
Payment and Settlement Systems (WC-PSS). An 
example identified in the studies is the region’s 
eventual participation in continuous linked settle-
ment, which would reduce foreign exchange 
settlement risk. Other linkages could be between 
automated clearinghouses, real-time gross settle-
ment systems, or other systems.
Capacity building. Members are aware that differ-
ent conditions exist in each country. The harmo-
nization and the development of interoperability 
and inter-linkage among various PSS may require 
strategic and gradual planning based on the readi-
ness of each individual country. ASEAN has thus 
identified capacity building as a parallel track to 
the above recommendations that should cut across 
all five study areas. ASEAN will act as coordinator 
to find suitable solutions such as workshops and 
attachment programs based on identified needs.
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IX. Capital Market Development
T he AEC Blueprint 2015 pertaining to capi-tal markets seeks to achieve significant progress in building a regionally integrated 
market, where within the region (i) there is freer 
movement of capital, (ii) issuers are freer to raise 
capital anywhere, and (iii) investors are freer to 
invest anywhere. In such a market, anyone would 
be able to trade in ASEAN capital market products 
freely in any ASEAN market at a competitive fee 
from a single access point, with capital market inter-
mediaries being able to provide services through-
out ASEAN based on home country approval. 
Work plans have been outlined by the Working 
Committee on Capital Market Development 
(WCCMD) and the ACMF to further capital 
market integration. These form a ready frame-
work for integration in the capital markets. The 
ACMF is overseeing specific initiatives to promote 
capital market development, including (i) estab-
lishment of an expedited review framework for 
secondary listing applications, (ii) the launching 
of an ASEAN Corporate Governance Scorecard 
for assessing corporate governance practices 
of ASEAN listed companies, (iii) the develop-
ment of ASEAN disclosure standards that will 
facilitate more efficient cross-border securities 
offerings within the region, and (iv) the work of 
ASEAN exchanges to launch the ASEAN Trading 
Linkage and develop a model for the integration 
of post-trade services.
Key initiatives under the WCCMD work plan 
include (i) the development of an ASEAN Bond 
Market Development Scorecard, which is a “living 
document” to track the state of ASEAN’s bond 
market development, openness and liquidity; 
(ii) facilitating the implementation of targeted 
and focused capacity-building programs to help 
members address market gaps identified in 
the scorecard; and (iii) further close coopera-
tion and coordination with other ASEAN capital 
market initiatives at WCPSS or ACMF, for exam-
ple, including an independent study with the 
ASEAN Secretariat and ACMF to pinpoint key 
gaps hindering market development, and develop 
policy recommendations for individual member 
countries. Such new initiatives and joint efforts 
will ensure that WCCMD and other related capital 
market work streams will play their roles in 
helping to comprehensively address gaps in 
ASEAN’s capital market development.
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X.  Beyond Integration: What Is Next  
for the ASEAN Community?
F inancial integration is essentially a market-driven process, which can be set in motion by domestic financial market liber-
alization and CAL. In this market-driven process 
the role of ASEAN governments is essentially to 
develop regional financial market infrastructure 
in addition to removing restrictions and reforming 
policies that obstruct cross-border movements of 
capital. It should also be emphasized that CAL 
will eventually lead in the long run to the unifica-
tion of the domestic financial markets of ASEAN 
with those of countries outside the region because 
the fungibility of money and finance would make 
it difficult to discriminate against non-ASEAN 
borrowers and lenders even if it were possible 
under multilateral rules.
The proposed plan for creating the AEC is 
expected to be carried out simultaneously in the 
areas of trade and finance, though there has been 
more emphasis on trade integration. In theory, 
causal relations between trade and financial 
liberalization could run either way. In reality, they 
seem to vary from country to country and from 
region to region. In a regional setting, freer trade 
could produce pressure for regional financial 
market integration and intra-regional exchange 
rate stability. Monetary and financial integra-
tion therefore generates incentives for and facili-
tates trade expansion and integration. But, in a 
few member states, the simultaneous pursuit of 
trade and financial liberalization may overstretch 
their limited capacity for reform, and hence those 
states may have to proceed first with trade liberal-
ization. This ordering does not necessarily mean 
that there is no scope for financial reform. It only 
means that the plan for financial market opening 
may need to be adjusted, taking into account the 
administrative capacity of each member state.
The current global financial crisis has raised a new 
set of questions in the emerging world regarding 
the desirability of global financial integration and 
the means of achieving it. Countries with an open 
capital market have suffered relatively more from 
the crisis than others, as they have been unable 
to shield themselves fully from external shocks 
irrespective of the foreign exchange regime in place. 
Without a global lender of last resort and regula-
tory institution, the globalized financial system is 
susceptible to a breakdown as a result of market 
overreaction, panic, and mania. In opening up the 
financial markets, therefore, ASEAN policy makers 
will need to take precautionary measures to miti-
gate the impact of external shocks. This precau-
tion calls for regulatory reform in the individual 
member states in line with the global reform 
under way and highlights the need to consolidate 
regulatory cooperation at the regional level.
According to a forecast by the IMF, ASEAN will 
grow at 5.5% per year in 2011–2015, raising its 
average per capita income to $10,603 by 2015. 
Extending the horizon further, we believe that 
ASEAN has the potential to sustain the rapid 
growth beyond 2015. Combined with rapid 
growth, a successful completion of the plans for 
FSL and CAL will allow ASEAN to construct an 
integrated ASEAN-wide financial system that 
is highly sophisticated, diversified, and open to 
foreign savers and investors.
However, the success of ASEAN integration is not 
a foregone conclusion. For a long time, the ASEAN 
member state authorities’ overriding concern 
with financial stability—which may well be legiti-
mate, in view of what was experienced at the time 
of the global financial crisis—has necessitated 
an uneven and prolonged approach to capital 
account and financial services liberalization. The 
aims of CAL, as envisioned in the implementation 
plans for individual countries, are modest at best, 
with adequate safeguards; unlike the EU, ASEAN 
does not envision the complete elimination of all 
restrictions, prudential or otherwise, on cross-
border capital flows, even by 2020 or 2025. 
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Likewise, the implementation plans for FSL have 
deliberately been based on a two-pronged, two-
tiered approach. They reflect the realism that 
some financial services liberalization should move 
forward while the existing domestic financial 
institutions and systems are developed and 
strengthened, and this has necessarily created two 
separate tracks—one for “regional champions”, 
and the other for all other institutions mainly 
serving the interests of domestic customers. 
The need to pursue a consistent macroeconomic 
policy mix as the countries liberalize their cross-
border capital flows was noted earlier. Initially, 
this means that the member states must allow 
their exchange rates to become more flexible if 
they are to retain monetary independence. As 
financial integration proceeds, with the expected 
liberalization of trade, investment, and move-
ment of skilled labor, there will be greater pres-
sure for intra-regional exchange rate stability. 
It will be challenging to create a single market 
and production base with widely fluctuating 
exchange rates. 
If financial integration proves successful, the 
ASEAN member states must accept the inevitable 
possibility of region-wide consolidation in the 
financial landscape. Indeed, consolidation is a 
fact of life in the financial world. For example, 
some of the world’s leading stock exchanges are 
discussing potential mergers. Leading global 
banking institutions are either being consolidated 
or purchasing smaller institutions to increase 
size. As the ASEAN member states further liberal-
ize and becomes part of the global economy, they 
cannot expect to avoid the wave of consolidation 
that will inevitably follow. As the experience of 
the EU shows, this is unlikely to mean that many 
existing domestic institutions and markets will 
disappear. More likely, there will be a two- or 
three-tier market structure in which some domes-
tic institutions serve strictly local needs while 
others compete with their global or regional peers 
across national borders. Likewise, the boundar-
ies between national markets may increasingly 
blur for regionally or globally known institutions, 
but national markets may still remain viable for 
local institutions.
Some of these outcomes may sound daunting to 
ASEAN policy makers. But the process of inte-
gration and consolidation will continue to be 
an inescapable reality as long as member states 
wish to remain part of the global economy. In 
this environment, small economies must special-
ize in a few things they do best to survive. They 
cannot expect to offer all services to all people 
in all market segments. Indeed, this is the very 
reason the ASEAN leaders have embarked on the 
process of creating a single market and produc-
tion base as a means of joining forces together. 
So as not to be left out, the ASEAN member 
states must commit anew to creating a single 
market and production base. Full and complete 
capital account and financial services liberaliza-
tion is ultimately key to the success of the AEC. 
Though a gradual and judicious approach is the 
only pragmatic and feasible option at the pres-
ent, this must be considered as a step toward the 
eventual elimination of all restrictions on cross-
border capital flows and financial services. To 
make this safe and possible, the ASEAN member 
states must start creating and strengthening the 
requisite regional institutions.
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